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Note & Recensioni
Marcos Silva (ed.), How Colours Matter to Philosophy, Springer, 
New York 2017, 326 pp. 
«Colours induce us to philosophize». This is how the editor’s 
Introduction to this ambitious volume begins. Eighteen papers, 
divided into three parts, consider the relation between colour and 
philosophy from different points of view: History of Philosophy 
(Part I), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Part II) and Phi-
losophy of Language and Logic (Part III). In fact, one of the goals 
of Silva, who is also the editor of another volume on Colours in the 
Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 
is to broaden the focus of the philosophical debate on colour, cen-
tered until now «primarily in the naturalist tradition of analytic 
philosophy». Silva’s reference here is to some classical texts such as 
Readings on Color, edited by Byrne and Hilbert (1996), and Colors 
for Philosophers by C. L. Hardin (1988). These books are quoted and 
discussed quite often inside the volume, but the connection that they 
state between the very idea of colour and the enquiries of natural 
sciences is not the only point of view. In this respect, Silva’s work 
aims at building a bridge between the «analytic and continental 
philosophical traditions» in relation to the question of colour. This 
means also that «the extant literature based on the naturalistic tradi-
tion» has to be examined «given the grounding of a conscientious 
historical perspective». It is not by chance that the first two essays of 
the book are dedicated respectively to Democritus and Plato. Moreo-
ver, according to Silva, it is necessary to extend the investigation on 
colour also to the sphere of language and logic (and this is actually 
what he does in the third part of the book).
The first part of the volume starts with a paper by B. Maund, 
editor of the entry “Colour” for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy. Maund starts from a famous fragment on colour by Democri-
tus, in order to challenge the traditional difference between elimi-
nativism and dispositionalism. In order to be consistent, he argues, 
dispositionalism – the theory according to which colours are dispo-
sitions to look in a certain way to a certain observer – has to admit 
a component of error or illusion in our experience. Dispositionalism 
206 Note & Recensioni
becomes compatible, this way, with eliminativism: 
colours don’t really exist in the real world or, as 
Democritus says, they exist only «by convention». 
In the second paper E. Txapartegi tries to 
show, through an analysis of Plato’s Timaeus, 
that colour terms in ancient Greece referred to 
hues (and not brightness or other aspects, as 
many scholars suggested). This «adds credibility», 
according to Txapartegi, to the Universal and Evo-
lutionary (UE) model, suggested by Berlin and 
Kay at the end of the 1960’, according to which 
there are few basic colour categories to which all 
languages tend to approximate. 
The third essay, by K. Walsh, considers New-
ton’s revolutionary discovery about colour: natural 
light is not homogeneous but composed of differ-
ent types of rays, which are reflected in different 
ways and give birth to different colours. Newton 
indicates 7 main colours and the author tries to 
investigate the reason of this. Newton is the start-
ing point also of the following paper, by O. L. Mül-
ler, who compares Newton’s research on colour to 
Goethe’s. Müller’s thesis is that, although Newton 
got the “right” result, Goethe reflected more deeply 
on the method of scientific investigation.
The last three papers of the section focus on 
Wittgenstein and Husserl. Concerning the latter, 
J. da Silva confronts Husserl’s perspective, accord-
ing to which truths about colours are synthetic 
apriori, with Schlick’s objection that this kind of 
truths actually doesn’t exist, because they rely on 
language. The phenomenological perspective is the 
object also of K. Mülligan’s paper, which exam-
ines some important similarities between Witt-
genstein’s Remarks on Colour and David Katz’s Die 
Erscheinungsweisen der Farben (1911). Yet there 
is also a fundamental difference: «what Katz and 
other phenomenologists think of as non-contin-
gent connexions between colour phenomena» for 
Wittgenstein «are in fact rules for using colour 
words». The section is closed with a paper by A. 
Lugg, who aims at defending Wittgenstein from 
the naturalistic trend in philosophy, according 
to which colours have to be investigated through 
natural sciences rather than through an analy-
sis of language (see for that A. Danto, Preface to 
Hardin, cit.). In order to do that, he takes up the 
case of the impossible colours (the most famous of 
which is Wittgenstein’s “greenish red”) and shows 
that the problems are not solvable by simply sub-
stituting the naturalistic approach to Wittgenstein’s 
logical approach. 
The second part of the volume opens with 
a paper by P. Ross, who defends a physicalistical 
view of colour. According to physicalism, colours 
have to be identified with certain physical prop-
erties of objects. Yet this doesn’t imply, according 
to Ross, to consider colour as a «primary quality». 
Colour remains a «secondary quality», because 
the physical properties that constitute colours are 
filtered by our perception. Yet physicalism under-
goes also another kind of problem, which is exam-
ined by N. Unwin in the following paper. How can 
we know that other people see the same colours 
that we see, rather than, for example, inverted col-
ours? Unwin argues against this famous hypothe-
sis of the «inverted spectrum», showing that there 
are some important analogies between the phe-
nomenology of colour and its physiological per-
ception. 
In the third paper, B. Ainbinder asks himself 
why Heidegger never wrote about colour.  Accord-
ing to Ainbinder, far from being a problem for 
Heidegger’s thought (as many scholars state), col-
ours can be considered from an Heideggerian 
perspective in a way that permits to solve many 
problems. The following contribution, by Stekel-
er-Weithofer, goes back to Wittgenstein. Like A. 
Lugg, Stekeler-Weithofer starts from the privileged 
position that physical sciences have acquired in 
the present philosophy of colour. His suggestion, 
against this physicalistic approach, is to under-
stand colour sensations as a limit-concept and col-
ours as general distinctions that we make. A guide 
to this task, according to the author, is not only 
Wittgenstein, but also Hegel (whose thoughts on 
colour, however, are not mentioned).
The last paper of this section, by O. Bueno, 
is dedicated to the question of colour in the arts. 
Bueno’s thesis is that whether colour’s phenom-
enology is quite «constant», its meaning in the arts 
can «vary» considerably. 
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The last section starts with an essay by G. 
Priest, who addresses from a logical point of 
view an intriguing question: can we see contra-
dictory colours (like red and green) at the same 
time? Priest’s answer is yes. In order to demon-
strate this, he shows a continuous progression (a 
«sorite progression») from red to green, in which 
the transition-states are at the same time red and 
green. Colour predicates are «vague», then. This 
is also the thesis of the following contribution, by 
D. Raffman. Raffman as well starts from a sorites 
series of colors, processing from blue to green. She 
refers to some experiments that have been done, 
in which the application of colour predicates (blue 
or green) by the same subject varies according to 
the two phases – from right to left and vice versa 
– in which the series is seen. The following two 
papers are dedicated to the «homology of rela-
tions» between natural logic and the logic of col-
ours. Both structures are represented by D. Jaspers 
through an hexagon of oppositions, while J. Y 
Beziau picks up Jaspers’ hexagon in order to sug-
gest a combination of colours and «phsychic dis-
positions». The last two contributions are dedicat-
ed to some mathematical problems that have to do 
with colours: the Four Color Theorem, analysed 
by G. D. Secco and L. C. Pereira in the light of 
Wittgenstein’s idea of a surveyability of mathemat-
ical rules, and Ramsey’s theory of finite combiato-
rics, through which W. Carnielli and C. di Prisco 
investigate «why colors matter for mathematics».
This volume offers a great overview of how 
broad the question of colour can be. Even more 
importantly, it shows how colour requires from us 
a very philosophical task: that of crossing borders. 
Of course some fields remain barely sketched, for 
example the problem of colour in art (addressed 
only in one paper). A deeper investigation of this 
question may have contributed to shed light on 
another more general issue. In fact, the volume 
considers attentively the tension between natural 
sciences and logic. Yet there is another border that 
seems to be less considered in this text: the «bor-
derline between logic and the empirical» (Witt-
genstein, Remarks on Colour, III.19), or between 
abstract colours and colours in our everyday expe-
rience. If we focus on this sphere – on our normal 
experience of colour – another question arises. 
Can the perception of colour really be separated 
from its meaning? In other words, is it really cor-
rect to consider subjectivity – as Stekelr-Weithofer 
states – as a limit-concept, in order to focus either 
on colour terms (linguistic approach) or on col-
our perception (naturalistic approach)? This is a 
puzzling question indeed and certainly this book 
increases our will to puzzle.
Table of contents: Introduction (Silva, Marcos); 
Part I. History of Philosophy: Dispositionalism: 
Democritus and Colours by Convention (Maund, 
Barry); Hue, Brightness & Saturation in Classi-
cal Greek Chroma Terms (Txapartegi, Ekai); How 
Many Colours? (Walsh, Kirsten); Goethe contra 
Newton on Colours, Light, and the Philosophy of 
Science (Müller, Olaf L.); On Color: The Husser-
lian Material a Priori (Silva, Jairo José); Impossible 
Colours: Wittgenstein and the Naturalist’s Challenge 
(Lugg, Andrew); Part II. Phenomenology and Phi-
losophy of Mind: Colours – Wittgenstein vs (Katz 
& Bühler) (Mulligan, Kevin); What the Mind-
Independence of Color Requires (Ross, Peter W.); 
Explaining Colour Phenomenology (Unwin, Nich-
olas); Dasein Is the Animal That Sorts Out Colors 
(Ainbinder, Bernardo); Subjectivity and Norma-
tivity in Colour-Distinctions (Stekeler-Weithofer, 
Pirmin); Colors: Presentation and Representation in 
the Fine Arts (Bueno, Otávio); Part III. Philosophy 
of language and Philosophy of Logic: Things Are 
Not What They Seem (Priest, Graham); Vagueness, 
Hysteresis, and the Instability of Color (Raffman, 
Diana); Logic and Colour in Cognition, Logic and 
Philosophy (Jaspers, Dany); A Chromatic Hexagon 
of Psychic Dispositions (Beziau, Jean-Yves); Proofs 
Versus Experiments: Wittgensteinian Themes Sur-
rounding the Four-Color Theorem (Secco, Gisele 
Dalva et al.); The Wonder of Colors and the Princi-
ple of Ariadne (Carnielli, Walter et al.).
(di Alice Barale)
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Menninghaus, W., Wagner, V., Hanich, J., Was-
siliwizky, E., Jacobsen, T., and Koelsch, S.,  The 
distancing-embracing model of the enjoyment of 
negative emotions in art reception, “Behavioral 
and Brain Science”,  40, 2017, 1-58.
The article of Menninghaus and colleagues 
focuses on the well-known (and apparent) para-
dox concerning the enjoyment of negative emo-
tions in art reception. On the basis of recent psy-
chological data, the article proposes a model cen-
tered on two kinds of mechanisms. The first group 
of mechanisms (art, representation, and fiction 
schemata) represents distancing processes that 
allow the personal safety of the recipients, there-
by preventing negative emotions from becom-
ing incompatible with enjoyment and pleasure. 
The second group of mechanisms (compositional 
interplays of positive and negative emotions, aes-
thetic virtues of the representations, and mean-
ing-making efforts) allows recipients to positively 
embrace the experiencing of negative emotions.
The model represents an interesting proposal, 
even if at present the hypotheses are too specula-
tive and rest on scarce evidence. Above all, in the 
present version the model has two relevant theo-
retical limitations, the first one concerning the dis-
tancing factors (1), the second one concerning the 
embracing factors (2).
(1) The authors correctly stress that nega-
tive ordinary emotions have three key properties: 
they are particularly powerful in securing atten-
tional resources, intense emotional involvement, 
and privileged storage in memory. According to 
many strands of evidence, the underlying rationale 
is that negative ordinary emotions have a strong 
personal relevance. This is precisely the mean-
ing of the formula quoted by the authors: «bad is 
stronger than good». Obviously, in virtue of their 
personal relevance and negative valence, negative 
ordinary emotions are generally not associated 
with pleasure and enjoyment. In contrast, negative 
aesthetic emotions, that is emotions in response to 
art, are often integrated in pleasurable experiences. 
According to the model, the precondition of this 
phenomenon is constituted by the cognitive mech-
anism that keeps negative aesthetic emotions at 
some psychological distance. As a consequence of 
the so-called “art, representation, and fiction sche-
mata” (p. 4), subjects are aware that during aes-
thetic experience there is a condition of personal 
safety and they are in control of the situation.
So, in line with a widespread agreement 
among experts, the model posits that negative 
aesthetic emotions, although genuine and authen-
tic emotional episodes, are not activated by ordi-
nary, immediate, instrumental, and practical per-
sonal goals. However, if by definition negative 
aesthetic emotions entail «little direct personal 
goal relevance» (p. 13), how can they engage the 
same three properties of negative ordinary emo-
tions? The authors explicitly argue that the dis-
tancing effect «does not convert, let alone erase, 
negative emotional responses, and need not even 
reduce the felt intensity of these responses in 
order to make them (more) compatible with posi-
tive enjoyment» (p. 15). However, the distancing 
mechanism inhibits the strong real-world personal 
relevance and therefore it does not explain how 
negative aesthetic emotions can activate a power-
ful grip on attention, emotional involvement, and 
high memorability. Moreover, this difficulty can-
not be solved by the intervention of the embrac-
ing factors. By definition they «allow art recipients 
to positively embrace the experience of negative 
emotions«» (p. 1): they link a negative experi-
ence with a positive one, but they do not endow 
this negative experience with strong personal rel-
evance. So, this is the first missing point of the 
model:  it does not explain the personal relevance 
of negative aesthetic emotions and how they can 
have the same three key properties of negative 
ordinary emotions.
(2) The pleasurable experience allowed by the 
embracing factors is denoted by different terms: 
“enjoyment”, (“hedonic”) “reward”, “rewarding 
quality”, “liking”, (“intellectual/emotional”) “pleas-
ure”, (“pleasurable/positive”) “affect”, “aesthetic 
appeal, appraisal, appreciation”. However, these 
terms evidently refer to a heterogeneous set of 
very different affective and emotional phenomena 
that ranges from elementary and immediate reac-
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tions to elaborated and sophisticated processes of 
appraisal. So the model does not afford an accu-
rate typology of the pleasurable experiences asso-
ciated with negative aesthetic emotions. 
In particular, the model does not distinguish 
between first-order pleasurable experiences and 
higher-order ones. From this point of view, «inter-
plays of positive and negative emotions» (p. 17) 
and «concomitant mixed emotions as bipolar 
mediators» (p. 20) are clearly first-order emotional 
reactions directly experienced in response to the 
representational properties – such as setting, char-
acters, and events in narrative. In the case of sad-
ness, Menninghaus and colleagues explicitly reject 
the hypothesis about compassion/empathy as a 
self-gratifying response involving a meta-emotion-
al (re)appraisal. Accordingly, «aesthetic virtues» 
factors are largely first-order emotional reactions 
directly experienced in response to aesthetic prop-
erties inherent to the representation itself – such 
as coloring, execution, poetic style, and so on. 
On the contrary, there is a widespread agreement 
among experts that aesthetic pleasure is a high-
er-order experience accompanying elaboration, 
grounded in and function of first-order process-
ing experience of artworks. Precisely, it is usually 
defined as a higher-order phenomenal signals pro-
voked by constant self-monitoring of ongoing cog-
nitive processing, automatically elicited by internal 
and experiential cues associated with fluency – or 
dis-fluency, that is insightfully predictive error 
reduction.
This is another very relevant missing point for 
the model. Because aesthetic pleasure is a higher-
order phenomenon, it is largely irrespective of the 
artwork’s intrinsic affective and emotional con-
tents as such. Even if the first-order experience 
provided by the artwork is strongly negative, this 
experience may result pleasurable and appreci-
ated at the higher-level because it allows a relevant 
dynamic of fluent/dis-fluent understanding. So, 
for instance, in the case of horror films there is no 
need of additional explanatory mechanisms like 
the «benign-masochism hypothesis» (p. 35). 
In my view, both the theoretical limitations 
of the model can be quite easily overcome. The 
main step is to consider aesthetic experience as an 
experience of knowledge: it is a function of pre-
vious knowledge and already acquired skills and 
at the same time a powerful means of improving 
advancement of understanding and enabling fur-
ther skills acquisition. Obviously, the basic goal 
of knowledge can be instantiated in two oppo-
site ways that correspond to two fixed and con-
stantly active sub-goals of the brain: confirma-
tion and preservation, exploration and growth of 
knowledge. The basic goal of knowledge enables 
the real-world personal goal relevance of negative 
aesthetic emotions. Immersed in intense negative 
feelings, subjects can re-enact emotional schemata 
previously entrenched in memory and/or discover 
new emotional features that defy habitual expec-
tations. Accordingly, negative aesthetic emotions 
can be associated with a pleasurable experience as 
a consequence of two different forms of aesthetic 
pleasure, the first one as a fluency-based higher-
order experience monitoring the goal of confirma-
tion, the second one as a disfluency-based higher-
order experience monitoring the goal of explora-
tion.
In sum, the theoretical limitations of the mod-
el directly derive from the mistaken methodologi-
cal choice of considering the «functional benefits» 
of art irrelevant for «the immediate experiential 
correlate of exposure to artworks» (p. 7). On the 
contrary knowledge plays a pivotal role in deter-
mining the experience of art and its personal rel-
evance.
(di Gianluca Consoli) 
François Jullien, Si près, tout autre. De l’écart et 
de la rencontre, Grasset, Paris 2018, pp. 234.
Con il suo volume Si près, tout autre. De l’écart 
et de la rencontre (Grasset, Paris 2018), François 
Jullien – filosofo, ellenista e sinologo da molti anni 
impegnato nell’esplorazione dei rapporti tra pen-
siero europeo e pensiero cinese – offre al dibattito 
internazionale un ulteriore, importante momento 
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di elaborazione della sua riflessione, per molti ver-
si incardinata sulla ricomprensione di quel nodo 
filosoficamente cruciale che è il tema dell’alterità. 
In Si près, tout autre il punto di partenza dell’inda-
gine sviluppata, con la consueta finezza, dall’auto-
re è costituito dalla consapevolezza che, se «pen-
ser autrement» è la “parola d’ordine tradizionale” 
della filosofia, o piuttosto – precisa Jullien – il 
suo «vieux rêve» –, è precisamente la possibilità 
di accostarsi a qualcosa che sia veramente “altro” 
a dover essere interrogata e ripensata radicalmen-
te. Cosa significa, insomma, “accedere all’altro”? È 
possibile farlo? E come?
Secondo l’originale taglio prospettico offerto 
qui da Jullien, indugiare nella perlustrazione di 
questi interrogativi significa innanzitutto rilanciare 
la possibilità di un pensiero che, ponendosi all’al-
tezza di questa sfida teoretica tutt’altro che ovvia, 
sappia rimettere in discussione abiti di pensiero e 
pratiche di sapere, “atavicamente” incorporati nel-
la cultura occidentale, che si qualificano invece 
per la loro tendenza a procedere per opposizio-
ni e distinzioni, per delimitazioni e definizioni. Il 
che, sempre secondo Jullien, presuppone un’idea 
del pensiero come strategia demarcante-differen-
ziante che “lavora” con (e a partire da) termini già 
concepiti nella forma di “enti” o di “stati di cose”: 
termini, cioè, ripiegati sulla loro identità con sé 
stessi e rigidamente chiusi nel loro isolamento. 
È quanto la tradizione metafisica occidentale, in 
modi diversi, ha ratificato e consacrato, eleggendo 
perentoriamente ad assioma fondativo della pro-
pria strategia epistemica l’aristotelico principio di 
non-contraddizione. Di qui, allora, il prevalere di 
quella logica disgiuntiva e definitoria (classifica-
toria e categorizzante) che trasforma le antonimie 
linguistiche, vale a dire le opposizioni e le diffe-
renze istituite all’interno del nostro linguaggio 
comune, in vere e proprie antinomie ontologiche 
ed epistemologiche.
Ebbene, è precisamente a questo livello che, 
secondo Jullien, occorre aprire uno scarto (un 
«écart»), valorizzando e facendo lavorare le linee 
di separazione e di divaricazione, le distanze e le 
fratture: quelle emergenti innanzitutto tra termini 
o nozioni che, nella frequentazione ordinaria del 
nostro linguaggio quotidiano, tendono a essere 
assunti semplicemente come “simili”, come “sino-
nimi” o come “omologhi”. Si tratta allora di intro-
durre nella fissità dell’ordine logico-linguistico 
storicamente vigente, nella pretesa trasparenza e 
nella quiete rassicurante delle sue differenziazioni 
demarcanti-delimitanti, quell’istanza euristicamen-
te sempre attiva di dissenso e di disturbo, di dere-
golamentazione e di decategorizzazione, che dis-
socia il pensiero dalla fissità del “noto”: dall’iner-
zia del già-conosciuto e del già-pensato. È quanto 
Jullien traduce, a livelli diversi, attraverso la messa 
in campo di una vasta costellazione di nozioni-
chiave, tra loro strettamente interrelate, che ruo-
tano tutte intorno all’idea dell’effrazione e della 
trasgressione, del turbamento e della dissidenza: 
débordement e dérangement, décalage e clivage, 
embranchement e béance, dérèglement e désarroi, 
défaillance e fêlure.
In questa prospettiva, “pensare altrimenti” 
significa essere in grado di fessurare il dato: signi-
fica far esplodere la coerenza semantica, e insieme 
la coesione sintattica, di quella trama di relazioni 
attraverso la quale il linguaggio e il pensiero arti-
colano il mondo, e il nostro farne esperienza, in 
sinonimie e similitudini, in equivalenze e omolo-
gie, in rapporti di contrarietà e-o di complemen-
tarietà. Ma il punto è che, una volta riassorbito 
all’interno di quella trama logico-categoriale che 
il pensiero costruisce per dare ordine e stabilità al 
caos dell’esperienza, dell’altro non ne è più nulla: la 
riduzione dell’“altro” al rango di “opposto”, infatti, 
è già il risultato della messa in opera di una strate-
gia di inquadramento che, nel porre analiticamen-
te il diverso “di fronte” all’identico – nell’assegnar-
gli, cioè, un ruolo e una funzione all’interno della 
relazione differenziale-oppositiva (come esemplar-
mente avviene nel caso della diaìresis platonica) 
–, finisce per collocare e per allineare quella stes-
sa presunta alterità nella griglia di un ordine già 
da sempre governato dalla non-contraddittorietà 
dell’identico. Includere l’altro nella tessitura di un 
ordine semantico-concettuale già fondato sul pri-
mato preventivamente accordato alla datità dell’i-
dentico significa, allora, “perdere” l’altro: significa 
negarlo, appunto, in quanto altro.
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Da questo punto di vista, il compito al quale il 
pensiero deve essere in grado di assolvere si rivela 
fondamentalmente duplice: si tratta infatti, per un 
verso, di dare corso a una pratica di dis-assimila-
zione del simile (per scongiurare il rischio omoge-
neizzante-uniformante di una prospettiva franca-
mente “monistica”) e, per altro verso, di procede-
re alla messa in atto di un lavoro di dis-esclusione 
degli opposti, intendendo con ciò la capacità che 
il pensiero deve avere di portare a manifestazione 
la loro interdipendenza e la loro indisgiungibilità 
(il che, invece, permette di evitare quella scissione 
della vita, quella lacerazione cioè della sua unità, 
che è invece l’esito al quale conduce ogni possibile 
prospettiva di tipo “dualistico”). Di contro a ogni 
possibile dualismo, dunque, ecco riaffiorare poten-
temente l’idea eraclitea della palìntropos harmonìe, 
l’idea cioè di una permanente “cooperazione degli 
opposti”, da intendersi come un antixoùn parados-
salmente coincidente con la dimensione del sym-
phèron.
“Dis-assimilare il simile”, quindi, e insieme 
“dis-escludere gli opposti”: a questo deve mirare 
un pensiero autenticamente capace di porsi all’al-
tezza di quella sua irrinunciabile sfida teoretica, e 
insieme etica, che è la ricerca dell’altro in quanto 
altro. È quanto Jullien appunto ci propone nella 
densa trama argomentativa del suo Si près, tout 
autre. Qui, infatti, quale che sia la coppia di ter-
mini apparentemente simili/affini di volta in volta 
presa in esame (scarto-differenza, senso-coerenza, 
incontro-relazione, godimento-piacere, ripresa-
ripetizione, differire-rinviare, equivocità-ambigui-
tà, altro-opposto, esplorare-spiegare), la messa in 
atto dell’originale strategia critico-decostruttiva 
suggerita da Jullien si traduce operativamente 
nell’inscrizione di una distanza, nell’introduzione 
cioè di una incrinatura (una fêlure) e di una diva-
ricazione (un embranchement), capace di mante-
nere produttivamente in tensione reciproca i due 
termini appartenenti a quella medesima coppia 
concettuale.
In questo modo, ad affiorare con la massima 
flagranza è la virtù tipicamente esplorativa ascri-
vibile alla nozione di “scarto”: la sua capacità di 
promuovere il dispiegamento attivo del pensiero 
proprio attraverso il riconoscimento di quella ine-
sauribile fecondità di risorse semantico-concettuali 
– risorse da sondare e da difendere, da scrutare e 
da valorizzare – che è implicita nello spazio inten-
sivo del “tra-due” e che, sola, è in grado di aprire il 
pensiero alla possibilità del “nuovo”. «C’est en per-
cevant de l’écart entre les semblables, à proximité, 
comme en percevant du commun entre les termes 
opposés – ci ricorda infatti Jullien – que pense la 
pensée». A delinearsi così è un quadro interpreta-
tivo all’interno del quale è precisamente l’incontro 
con l’inassimilabile eccedenza di senso incarnata 
dal “così accanto-tutt’altro” a costituire la risorsa 
essenziale della vita: il vettore capace di favorire e 
di sollecitare quell’inquieto «déploiement de la vie 
en ex-istence» che, in quanto espressione di una 
sua «dé-coïncidence» rispetto alla positività del già-
noto e alla fissità del già-compreso, ha la virtù di 
rigenerare l’orizzonte del senso. 
Procedendo dunque per scarti e “smarcandosi” 
così dal già-pensato, il pensiero ha la forza di libe-
rare l’altro: ha l’abilità di farlo “sgorgare” («jaillir») 
e “risaltare” («saillir») come pura esteriorità non-
sussumibile nell’ordine astratto del concetto: come 
espressione di un “fuori” che non si lascia integra-
re funzionalmente nello spazio del “proprio”. Libe-
rare l’altro significa allora liberare la possibilità di 
fare esperienza, nel finito, dall’interno stesso cioè 
di quel che di più vicino vi è nel vicino – dall’in-
terno stesso, insomma, di quel che di più sensibile 
vi è nel sensibile («au plus près, au plus sensible du 
sensible») –, di qualcosa che eccede il finito stes-
so. È quello che Jullien non esita a definire come 
lo spazio del “metafisico” (ma con la consapevolez-
za che “il” metafisico non coincide affatto con “la” 
metafisica, tradizionalmente intesa). Con questa 
espressione, infatti, Jullien allude a quella possibi-
lità di trascendere l’immanenza dall’interno stesso 
dell’immanenza della quale la nozione irriducibil-
mente paradossale di “jouissance”, opportunamen-
te “smarcata” dalla nozione solo apparentemente 
simile di “piacere” (e ricompresa, dunque, proprio 
attraverso lo “scarto” che la separa da essa), costi-
tuisce una delle espressioni esemplari.
Di qui, più in generale, l’emergere del tenore 
propriamente etico ascrivibile alla nozione di “si 
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près-tout autre” tematizzata da Jullien: «L’inouï est 
[…] une catégorie foncière, à défaut d’être fonda-
trice, puisque se défiant de l’ontologie. En disant 
l’Autre si proche, mais ne s’assimilant pas, l’inouï 
définit de façon rigoureuse ce qui fait la tension 
propre à l’ex-istence. Par suite, en disant cet Autre 
inaccessible, mais dont on se laisse heurter, l’i-
nouï est une catégorie éthique. Car on accepte, 
ou non […] de rencontrer cet inouï de l’Autre. “Il 
faut l’oser”». L’incontro con l’assolutamente Altro 
richiede, dunque, coraggio e impegno: esige un 
passaggio dalla logica identitaria del concetto alla 
logica paradossale dell’esistenza, imperniata innan-
zitutto sulla densità insieme emotiva e cognitiva 
del nostro sentirci in situazione. In questo senso, 
l’incontro con l’Altro presuppone la nostra dispo-
nibilità a credere nella possibilità del suo effettivo 
dispiegamento: la disponibilità, in termini eracli-
tei, a “sperare nell’insperabile”. Si tratta dunque di 
una dimensione che, potendo essere solo scelta, fa 
appello innanzitutto alla nostra libertà. «Croyance 
hardie – scrive, a questo riguardo, Jullien – croire, 
non pas à ce qui est ou n’est pas, mais bien “que ce 
qui est est”. Que ce qui est est: autrement dit, c’est 
l’effectif, à portée, mais inaccessible comme il est, 
ou le “réel”, comme on dit, mais non pas à séparer 
comme “en soi”, qui est l’inouï; et c’est à cet inouï 
qu’il faut “croire” pour le rencontrer».
Indice: Avertissements; I. Sous la proximité, la 
béance (Ou du plaisir à la jouissance); II. L’opposé 
n’est plus autre (Ou comment les contraires s’enten-
dent entre eux); III. Il faut fracturer le semblable 
(Ou les vrais embranchements n’apparaissent pas); 
IV. L’écart qui s’ouvre fait découvrir (Ou de la jou-
issance à l’existence); V. Si près surgit l’Autre (Ou 
qu’est-ce que rencontrer?); De l’inconscient à l’inouï.
(di Antonio Valentini)
